Evaluating "Cash-for-Clunkers"
Introduction
Amid a major recession and growing concerns about the environment, many countries have adopted programs that encourage consumers to trade in their old, inefficient vehicles, in exchange for more efficient ones. In the United States, the Cash-for-Clunkers program provided eligible consumers a $3,500 or $4,500 rebate when trading in an old vehicle and purchasing or leasing a new vehicle. Many other countries, such as France, the United Kingdom, and Germany, have similar programs, which generally share the same two goals: to provide stimulus to the economy by increasing auto sales, and to improve the environment. The U.S. program received enormous media attention and many considered the program to be a great success; during the program"s nearly one-month run, it generated 678,359 eligible transactions and had a cost of $2.85 billion. 1 But as a matter of economic theory, it is typically quite difficult to achieve multiple goals with a single policy. The large fiscal cost and public enthusiasm for these programs, and their widespread use around the world, raise the question of just how effective are they at meeting their economic and environmental goals.
While several other studies have analyzed particular aspects of the program, this study estimates the composition of the fleet of vehicles that would have been sold in the absence of the program, permitting a comprehensive evaluation of the program effect on vehicle sales, the environment and economic activity. First, we examine the program"s effects on new vehicle sales both during the program and in the several months before and after the program. Many  Shanjun Li is an Assistant Professor in the Dyson School of Applied Economics and Management at Cornell University, 424 Warren Hall, Ithaca, NY, 14853, email: sl2248@cornell.edu, phone: (607) 255-1832, fax: (607) . Joshua Linn is a Fellow at Resources for the Future (RFF), 1616 P Street NW, Washington, DC, 20036, email: linn@rff.org, phone: (202) 328-5047, fax: (202) . Elisheba Spiller is a email: spiller@rff.org, phone: (202) 328-5147, fax: (202) . We thank Soren Anderson, Antonio Bento, Maureen Cropper, Robert Hammond, Paul Portney, Kevin Roth, and Chris Timmins for helpful comments and Jeffrey Ferris and Marissa Meir for excellent research assistance. This paper supersedes RFF Discussion paper 10-39 titled Evaluating "Cash for Clunkers": Program Effects on Auto Sales, Jobs and the Environment. 1 Transportation Secretary LaHood declared the program to be "wildly successful" at the end of the program, while two Op-Ed articles in the Wall Street Journal on August 2 nd and 3 rd raised doubts about whether the program truly increased sales and stimulated the economy. They argued that the program would most likely result in the shifting of future vehicle demand to the present and could hurt the sales of other goods.
observers of the program were concerned that it would primarily pull demand from adjacent months, and therefore it would provide little short-term stimulus and even less in the longer term.
Consequently, we focus on two types of changes in consumer behavior caused by the program: switching from purchasing low fuel-efficiency to high fuel-efficiency vehicles, and shifting the purchase time to take advantage of the program"s incentives.
Second, we evaluate the program"s cost-effectiveness in reducing gasoline consumption and carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) emissions by comparing total gasoline consumption as well as emissions of CO 2 and criteria pollutants with and without the program. There exist many federal subsidy programs aiming to reduce U.S. gasoline consumption and CO 2 emissions such as tax credits for ethanol blending and income tax incentives for purchasing hybrid vehicles. Our costeffectiveness analysis permits a comparison across the different programs.
The basis for these evaluations is the difference-in-differences (DID) analysis in a vehicle Canadian auto market is probably the most similar to the U.S. market: in both countries in recent years before the recession, about 13-14 percent of households annually purchased a new vehicle; characteristics of vehicles sold are similar; and pre-program time trends are similar. Although some differences in pre-program sales trends exist, they can be largely explained by differences in unobserved demand factors that we account for in our empirical model. The DID analysis shows that the program increased sales of vehicles that were eligible for the rebate (eligible vehicles) and lowered sales of ineligible vehicles during the program period. Furthermore, within eligible vehicles, the positive effect was larger for those with higher fuel efficiency -which yield a higher rebate under the program. The negative effect on ineligible vehicles was stronger for those that barely missed the eligibility requirement, implying that the program caused consumers to substitute from these vehicles to eligible vehicles. We find that the program resulted in lower sales in the months before and especially after the program, and that the effect on sales weakened over time. The empirical results thus suggest that the program resulted in consumer demand shifting from ineligible vehicles to eligible ones as well as shifting from pre-and post-program periods to program periods, with the inter-temporal shift having the strongest impact.
With the parameter estimates from the DID analysis, we simulate vehicle sales in the counterfactual scenario of no program. We find that the program resulted in a sales increase of only 0.36 million during July and August of 2009, implying that of the 0.66 million vehicles purchased under the program, 0.30 million would have been purchased anyway during these two months. The program effect on vehicle sales eroded further when we look at a longer time horizon: the increase in vehicle sales during June to December of 2009 was practically zero.
Therefore, we conclude that the program provided little economic stimulus. In addition, our simulation results show that Toyota, Honda and Nissan benefited from the program disproportionally more than other firms: with a combined market share of around 38 percent before the program, they accounted for more than 50 percent of the increased sales.
Based on the simulation results on vehicle sales, we estimate the differences in total gasoline consumption, CO 2 emissions, and four criteria pollutant emissions (carbon monoxide, volatile organic compounds, nitrogen oxides and exhaust particulates) with and without the program. We provide the results for 12 different cases, across which parameter and behavior assumptions vary. The total reduction in gasoline consumption ranges from 924.4 to 2930.8 million gallons while that in CO 2 emissions ranges from 9 to 28.4 million tons. After accounting for the program"s benefit in reducing criteria pollutants, we estimate that the program"s cost of CO 2 emissions reduction ranged from $91 to $288 per ton of CO 2 while that of gasoline consumption reduction ranged from $0.88 to $2.80 per gallon.
Several recent studies have evaluated particular aspects of the Cash-for-Clunkers program. Knittel (2009) The major difference between our analysis and the aforementioned studies lies in the fact that we use the DID approach to estimate counterfactual sales by vehicle model in the absence of the program. Knittel (2009) does not establish the counterfactual and does not examine program effects on vehicle sales. The other three studies estimate the sales effect based on heuristic rules and aggregate sales data and do not examine consumer substitutions across models and over time.
A recent study by Mian and Sufi (2010) is more closely related to ours in that we both establish counterfactual outcomes by exploiting variations in program exposure across different areas. The key differences are that they use variations across U.S. cities in ex-ante exposure to the program, but they do not look at environmental outcomes. They show an almost identical short-term effect (July and August) to ours and they argue that by as early as March 2011, the program effect was completely reversed. Copeland and Kahn (2011) use a time-series approach to examine the program effect on sales and on production. They find a slightly larger short-term effect on vehicles sales but also conclude that by January 2010, the cumulative effect of the program on sales was essentially zero.
Carefully analyzing the counterfactual is important for estimating the environmental benefits of the program. For example, we find a smaller cost per ton of CO 2 reduction than Knittel (2009) because we account for the difference between total CO 2 emissions during the remaining lifetime of the trade-in vehicles and the emissions from the new vehicles purchased to replace them, and the fact that the whole fleet of new vehicles purchased in the presence of the program would be more fuel efficient than that without the program; whereas Knittel (2009) only considers the first effect. Not analyzing the counterfactual fleet without the program can thus underestimate the program"s environmental benefit.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the program and the data in detail. Section 3 lays out the empirical framework. Section 4 provides estimation results and analyzes the program effect on auto sales. Section 5 examines the program impact on gasoline consumption and CO 2 emissions, and Section 6 concludes.
Background and Data
In this section, we first discuss program background, including the timeline and eligibility rules. Next, we present the data set that are used in the empirical analysis.
Program Description
As Figure 1 The requirements become still less stringent for category 2 and 3 vehicles.
Data Description
We collect data on monthly vehicle sales for all models in the United States and Canada 
Empirical Strategy
In this section, we first discuss the channels through which the program could affect vehicle sales. We then describe our empirical model.
Potential Program Effects
In our analysis, we assume that the program did not affect vehicles sales prior to June 2009. Although some consumers may have known about the bill before the House passed it on June 9 th , we expect that the uncertainty surrounding the eligibility requirements as well as the bill"s final passage would greatly limit its effect before June 9 th . In fact, our estimation results
show that there is no significant effect on sales even in June. The program period is defined from
July 27 th to August 25 th . Although the program retrospectively recognized qualified sales from July 1 st until the official start date, the total number of these sales was only 30,317, which is less than the average daily sales during the first week of the program.
Because an automobile is a durable good, the program could affect vehicle sales before, during, or after the program period. During the program period, some consumers who would have purchased an ineligible model or chosen not to purchase a new vehicle may choose to purchase an eligible model instead. In addition, the program could result in consumers changing the purchase time in order to coincide with the program period (i.e., intertemporal substitution).
In the absence of the program, these consumers could have purchased an eligible or an ineligible vehicle in other periods. Both channels would increase total vehicle sales and improve fleet fuelefficiency. To a large extent, the design of the program in achieving the stimulus purpose was to pull demand forward from a sufficiently distant future when the economy was expected to be stronger. Thus, the time horizon over which the intertemporal substitution occurs is crucially important to the stimulus purpose but not so for the environmental purpose. The graph below illustrates different substitution channels.
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The degree of these substitutions could vary over product space as well as over time for several reasons. First, there could be a stronger substitution to eligible vehicles from vehicles that barely miss the MPG requirement, compared to the substitution from vehicles that have much lower fuel efficiency. This is due to the fact that higher fuel-efficiency vehicles tend to compromise on certain amenities such as horsepower and engine size, and thus a consumer would face a smaller trade off in amenities by only marginally increasing fuel efficiency. In addition, because high MPG vehicles could be eligible for a higher rebate ($4,500 versus $3,500) the program could have a stronger effect on the vehicles eligible for the higher rebate. Second, the substitution could exhibit heterogeneity over time. Intuitively, the intertemporal substitution should be stronger right before or after the program than farther away from the program.
Moreover, because the length of the program is not fixed and runs out when the designated amount of stimulus money is used up, the program could have a stronger stimulus effect at the beginning of the program period. In fact, the initial one billion dollars were used up within a week while the additional two billion dollars lasted for three weeks.
Empirical Model
We implement the difference-in-differences (DID) method in a regression framework where the Canadian auto market is used as the control group for the U.S. market. Our DID regression estimates how the program affected vehicle sales before, during, and after the program period on a monthly basis given the vehicle"s eligibility and other characteristics. Note that the first four terms are zero for the observations in Canada. These four terms capture the program effect on vehicle sales in the United States, and allow for different effects across vehicles. However, interpreting these coefficients as causal effects of the program hinges on the assumption that Canada is a valid control group. The other variables in the equation help in identifying the impact of the program on sales by controlling for country and vehicle observed and unobserved attributes. 4 For all the regressions presented in the paper, we also estimate a multinomial logit model in the linear form (Berry 1994) where we assume that consumers have a total of J vehicle models plus an outside good indexed by 0 (i.e., not purchasing a new vehicle) to choose from in a given month. The dependent variable is with and being the market shares of model j and the outside good that captures the decision of not purchasing a new vehicle respectively. The market size is the number of households in the two countries. The results are very close to the results from the linear models shown in Section 4. is dollars per mile (gasoline price/MPG).
denotes model (i.e., country-yearnameplate) fixed effects, which control for month-invariant observable and unobservable vehicle attributes (such as horsepower, weight, and product quality), as well as month-invariant demand shocks at the model level. and are country-month fixed effects to capture countryspecific seasonality for eligible and ineligible vehicles (such as December holiday effect). and are all country-specific fixed effects, controlling for country-specific demand and supply shocks that affect the level of vehicle sales (these would be equivalent to household or firm dummies in a canonical DID example). and are common year-month fixed effects for eligible and ineligible vehicles (these would be equivalent to time dummies in a canonical DID example). Because these fixed effects are used to capture demand shocks for the two groups of vehicles that are common in the two automobile markets, they give rise to the control group interpretation for the Canadian market. 5 Finally, is the random demand shock.
Testing for Pre-existing Trends
Our empirical models control for unobservables in several dimensions by including model fixed effects , common year-month fixed effects , and country-specific seasonality . Nevertheless, as we discussed above, the unbiasedness of the coefficient estimates hinges on the identifying assumption that the time trends in demand and supply are the same in the two countries. Otherwise, we risk interpreting preexisting differences in time trends as the effect of the program.
This identifying assumption cannot be directly tested, but we can take advantage of the data before the program period to test for differences in pre-existing trends. Similarity before the program would support the assumption that the trends are the same during and afterwards. This strategy has been used in many previous studies that have data for multiple periods before the treatment (e.g., Eissa and Liebman 1996, and Galiani et al. 2005 ).
The test can be carried out by estimating a modified version of equation (1) The economic downtown that started in the second half of 2008 raises a particular concern that the demand and supply trends were not similar in the two markets before or during the program. The recession in the United States was driven by the housing market crisis; the mortgage default rate increased dramatically and housing prices fell sharply at the onset of the crisis. By comparison, housing prices in Canada continued to increase until late 2008. In addition, the credit market in Canada was not impaired and did not experience the "credit crunch" as in the United States. As a result, the downturn in Canada was milder and the auto market in Canada did not contract as much as in the United States. 6 To address concerns about the downturn, we drop the data from June to December of 2008 as an alternative estimation to the estimation using the full data set. If the downturn were causing significant bias, we would expect to obtain different results by omitting these observations. As we show below, we obtain qualitatively similar results from these two estimations.
Estimation Results
We discuss the validity of using Canada as the control group. We then show the estimation results for the diff-in-diff regressions.
Canada as the Control Group
We provide qualitative and quantitative support for using Canada as the control group. The second justification for using the Canadian auto market as the control group is that it is probably the most similar to the U.S. market. About 13-14 percent of households purchased a new vehicle in recent years before the economic downturn in both countries. Table 2 on F-tests, we cannot reject that the trends are the same during the four-month period separately for eligible and ineligible vehicles. Note that the R-squared is higher for the shorter pre-program sample, which is consistent with the notion that the second half of 2008 was an atypical period.
Furthermore, the coefficients are not economically significant when compared to the program effects given by the parameter estimates discussed in the next section. For example, the coefficient on February for eligible vehicles in the first estimation is 0.02, suggesting that the increase in eligible vehicles in February (over January) is about 2 percent more in the United
States than in Canada (or about 11,000 units out of 550,000 total sales in the United States). The coefficient on ineligible vehicles in May is 0.16, which appears to be large, but because ineligible vehicles account for less than 20 percent of total sales, this corresponds to only 16,000
units. Thus, we conclude that the two countries have similar trends prior to the program, which supports the use of Canada as a control group. The coefficient estimates for September suggest that the program reduced sales of eligible vehicles and that the decrease in sales was larger for eligible vehicles with high MPGs, consistent with consumers moving purchases forward to take advantage of the program. The parameter estimates for October and November suggest a negative effect on sales but the estimates are not statistically significant.
Difference-in-Differences Results
For ineligible vehicles, the parameter estimates suggest a negative effect from July to December and a larger effect for vehicles that miss the MPG requirement by a smaller margin (e.g., a smaller |∆GPM|). This is consistent with the fact that when consumers switch from these vehicles to eligible vehicles, they do not need to make a large sacrifice in other vehicle attributes such as horsepower and size, as discussed in Section 3.
Program Effect on New Vehicle Sales and Fuel Efficiency
Based on the parameter estimates from Table 5 , we simulate new vehicle sales under the counterfactual scenario without the Cash-for-Clunkers program. The three plots in Figure 3 show sales effects for all, eligible, and ineligible vehicles from June to December of 2009 for the full sample. Dashed curves represent the 90 percent confidence intervals estimated by bootstrap.
The point estimates show the differences between observed and simulated sales. The three corresponding plots in Figure 4 are based on parameter estimates using the short pre-program sample.
The results in both figures demonstrate the two channels through which the program affects vehicles sales (Section 3.1). First, the sales of eligible vehicles increased in July and August but decreased in adjacent months, implying that some consumers shifted their purchase timing. Second, the program had a strong positive effect for eligible vehicles in August but a negative effect for ineligible vehicles from July to December, especially in August, suggesting that some consumers switched from ineligible vehicles to eligible vehicles.
The effect on sales in June was negative but not statistically different from zero in both estimations, supporting our modeling assumption that the program effect before June was negligible. Because the program was implemented from July 27 th -August 25 th , the effect on total sales in July and August captures the (positive) effect during the program period and the (negative) effect due to intertemporal substitution just before or after the program. The net effects are both positive in July and August, although the effect in July is not statistically significant in the second estimation. The sales effects are all negative in September to November from both figures, particularly in the second estimation. Panel 1 of Table 6 reports monthly observed and simulated sales of new vehicles from June to December of 2009. Column (1) gives the observed sales while column (2) provides simulation results based on the parameter estimates from the full sample. Columns (3) and (4) show program effects on sales and the standard errors from bootstrap. Columns (5) to (7) provide results based on the parameter estimates from the short pre-program sample.
The cumulative effect on sales during July and August is estimated to be about 365,000 units and 357,000 units from the two estimations, respectively. This suggests that out of the 660,000 program participants, about 300,000 would have purchased a new vehicle during July and August even without the program. This underscores that one cannot take the number of vehicles sold through the program as the net program effect on vehicle sales. In addition, the estimate suggests that about 45 percent of the total spending ($1.4 billion) went to consumers who would have purchased a new vehicle anyway. Looking at a longer horizon, neither of the estimates suggests a net gain in sales during the period from June to December. Our estimate of the short-term effect on sales of about 360,000 is essentially identical to that of Main and Sufi (2010) , despite the fact that different control groups are used. The point estimate is smaller than the 450,000 units from Copeland and Kahn (2011) , but their estimate is within the 90 percent confidence interval of ours. In addition, all three studies broadly conclude that the program effect on sales is short-lived, with ours suggesting an even shorter effect. 8
The second and third panels in Table 6 Table 7 reports the sales effects for individual firms during July-August, and JuneDecember of 2009. Toyota saw the biggest increase in sales while Chrysler saw the smallest in both time horizons based on the results from the full sample. Although only accounting for less than 40 percent of the market share, the three Japanese firms accounted for over 50 percent of the sales increase because they offer more fuel-efficient models than the U.S.-based firms. However, the results for the period of June-December provide evidence that the program did not lead to significant shifts in market shares among automakers.
Program Effects on Gasoline Consumption and the Environment
This section evaluates the effectiveness of the program in reducing motor gasoline consumption and CO 2 emissions. To that end, we compare the observed outcomes (i.e., gasoline consumption and CO 2 emissions) with the counterfactual outcomes in the absence of the program. In this section, we first discuss our method and then present the results.
Method
The program affects gasoline consumption and pollution through two channels. First, the program changes the fleet of new vehicles by causing some consumers to switch from fuelinefficient vehicles to fuel-efficient vehicles, and by causing other consumers to purchase a new vehicle when they would not have otherwise. Second, it affects the fleet of used vehicles because the trade-in vehicles have to be scrapped. A complete analysis of the two channels would involve an equilibrium model of the auto market (including both new and used vehicles) that includes the dynamic effects of the program on both channels in a unifying framework.
Instead, we investigate the two channels based on the results from the previous section together with some simplifying assumptions. The first assumption is that the scrappage of the trade-in vehicles did not affect the remaining fleet of used vehicles. To the extent that the program reduced the availability of used vehicles in the second-hand market and hence increase used vehicle prices and prolong their service, our analysis would over-estimate the energy and environmental benefits of the program. The second assumption concerns the long-term program effect on vehicle sales. Our results from estimation on both samples cannot reject a zero net effect during June to December of 2009. In our analysis, we assume that total sales of new vehicles under the counterfactual would be the same as the observed total sales. Nevertheless, Table 6 shows that the fleet composition (i.e., average MPG) is different under the two scenarios.
We compare actual and counterfactual gasoline consumption. Actual consumption is given by:
where is the total sales of vehicles of model j during the period, and is the lifetime vehicle miles traveled for model j. Lu (2006) estimates that the average lifetime VMT for passenger cars is 152,137 and that for light trucks is 179,954 based on the 2001 National Household Travel Survey. is fuel consumption, which is measured in gallons per mile.
Under the above two assumptions, there are two components of counterfactual gasoline consumption: (1) the amount consumed over their remaining lifetime by the clunkers that were not traded in; and (2) Table 8 .
With this information, we predict age-specific remaining VMT for each type of vehicle, which is also shown in Table 8 . Based on this method, the average remaining VMT of trade-in vehicles is 59,716 with an average remaining lifetime of 7 years. 9
The second term in equation (4) is the total lifetime gasoline consumption of new vehicles sold from June to December in the absence of the program. ̃ is the simulated sales of model j based on estimation results in the previous section. We adjust ̃ proportionally so that total sales of new vehicles would be the same under the two scenarios.
We conduct our analysis under two cases regarding in the second term of equation (4). In the first case, we use lifetime VMT for cars and light trucks. This assumes that without the Cash-for-Clunkers program, people would drive more (by the amount of VMT during the 9 We compared the trade-in vehicles to the vehicles from the 2001 National Household Survey (NHTS), which is a national survey on vehicle holdings and travel behavior. On average, the trade-in vehicles have higher mileage than the vehicles with the same age from the 2001 NHTS. The difference is larger for relatively new vehicles. Therefore, our analysis could overestimate the remaining lifetime of the trade-in vehicles and the environmental benefit of the program. Nevertheless, the majority of the trade-in vehicles are 10-20 years old and the average MPG of these vehicles are quite close in these two data sets.
remaining lifetime of the clunkers). In the second case, we adjust for these new vehicles so that total VMT from them and the clunkers under the counterfactual would be the same as the total VMT from new vehicles sold June-December of 2009 under the program. To the extent that having more vehicles (e.g., a new vehicle and a clunker) may induce extra travel under the counterfactual, the results from these two cases may bound the true effect on gasoline consumption. consumption. Therefore, the larger the rebound effect, the smaller the reduction in total gasoline consumption.
Results
Columns (3) to (6) present the dollar cost, from the perspective of government revenue, of a per unit reduction in gasoline consumption and CO 2 emissions. In calculating the unit cost, columns (3) and (4) take into account the benefit of the program in reducing four criteria pollutants (carbon monoxide, volatile organic compounds, nitrogen oxides, and exhaust particulates, i.e., CO, VOCs, NO x , and exhaust PM 2.5 ). The emissions of these pollutants per mile of travel for trade-in vehicles are from MOBILE6, a computer program maintained by EPA that calculates emission factors for different types of vehicles. The model takes into account the fact that as a vehicle ages, the emissions level per unit of travel can increase dramatically, especially for older vehicles. Thus, as the counterfactual scenario would lead to higher overall emissions of these criteria pollutants due to the clunkers not being scrapped, we estimate through MOBILE6 how many tons of these four pollutants are reduced due to the program. To translate these reductions into monetary terms, we assume that the average damage per ton of the four pollutants is $74.5, $180, $250, and $1,170, respectively. The average cost for carbon monoxide is the average of the range reported by McCubbin and Delucchi (1994) . The other three cost parameters are the median marginal damage from Muller and Mendelsohn (2009) .
Columns (3) and (4) report the dollar costs of reducing one gallon of gasoline consumed and one ton of CO 2 through the program, with the co-benefit of reduced criteria pollutants. These costs range from $0.88 to $2.80 for each gallon of gasoline while the cost of reducing one ton of CO 2 ranges from $91 to $288. Without taking into account the co-benefit of reducing criteria pollutants, the unit costs increase as shown in columns (5) and (6): the range for the cost per gallon of reducing gasoline consumption becomes $1.02 to $3.25 while that for CO 2 reductions becomes $106 to $334.
The implied fiscal cost of CO 2 reduction from the program is much larger than the social cost of CO 2 (social marginal damages) recently estimated by the United States Government Interagency Working Group (2010). Based on three integrated assessment models, the workgroup provides a range of $5 to $65 per ton for 2010 emissions (in 2007 dollars) with a central value of $21. In addition, the implied cost of CO 2 reduction from our analysis is also far greater than projected marginal costs under several recent legislative proposals. For example, the allowance price for CO 2 under the Waxman-Markey cap-and-trade bill is projected to be $17-$22 per metric ton in 2020 in EPA"s analysis in 2020 and $28 in CBO"s analysis. This suggests that there are less costly alternatives in reducing CO 2 to achieve the level of reduction in the bill (i.e., 17 percent reduction from 2005 level by 2020). However, since the Cash-for-Clunkers program also provides the benefit of stimulating the economy and the estimated cost is a cost to the government rather than the marginal abatement cost, it is perhaps not fair to compare the implied carbon cost of the program to the allowance price in a national cap-and-trade program.
To put our results in perspective, we compare the cost-effectiveness of the program with two other federal programs that use tax expenditure to reduce gasoline consumption and CO 2 emissions. The first is an excise tax credit of 51 cents per gallon of ethanol blended with gasoline (generally at a 10 percent rate). Metcalf (2008) estimates that the cost of reducing gasoline consumption is about $2 per gallon and that of reducing CO 2 emissions is over $1,700 per ton in 2005. The second policy for comparison is the income tax credit of up to $3,400 for hybrid vehicle purchases. Beresteanu and Li (2009) estimate that the cost of reducing gasoline consumption is about $1.80 per gallon and the cost of reducing CO 2 emissions is $177 per ton.
Thus, the unit cost estimates of reducing gasoline consumption for both programs are comparable to the cost of the Cash-for-Clunkers program. However, for reducing CO 2 emissions, the tax credit for ethanol is clearly dominated by the other two programs.
Conclusion
As part of the stimulus effort, the Cash-for-Clunkers program was so popular that it exhausted its original allocation of $1 billion within one week despite initial projections that the program would last three months. Nevertheless, while many considered the program to be a great success as a short-term stimulus measure, critics argued that the increased sales observed during the program period could be merely borrowed from immediate future months so that even the short-term effect on vehicle sales may not have been significant. Many have also raised doubts over the potential impact of the program on energy consumption and the environment.
Using a difference-in-differences approach with Canada as the control group, we have examined program effects on vehicle sales for different time-horizons as well as its impacts on pollutant emissions and gasoline consumption. Our analysis offers rather bleak evidence on the overall performance of the program. We find that a large portion of vehicles sold under the program was a result of demand switching from months surrounding the program: although the program increased vehicle sales by 0.36 million during July and August, the net effect on sales became practically zero by end of 2009. Furthermore, if the program were to be judged as an environmental program, the implied costs of reducing gasoline consumption and CO 2 emissions are quite high: the best-case scenario suggests a cost of over $91 in government expenditure for each ton of CO 2 avoided and almost 90 cents for each gallon of reduced gasoline consumption.
These evaluations of the program reflect the inherent difficulty of using a single policy to simultaneously accomplish multiple objectives. It would be important to examine whether alternative program designs would improve effectiveness and social welfare. This is out of the scope of our static framework since a structural model would be needed that incorporates both new and used vehicle markets. Nevertheless, some observations regarding program design can be made. First, given the unexpected popularity of the program and the much shorter program period than projected, it should be possible to achieve better environmental outcomes without hindering the stimulus effects by increasing the fuel economy requirements for new vehicles.
Second, our analysis shows that about 45 percent of program expenditure was spent on consumers who would have purchased a new vehicle even in the absence of the program. This speaks to the challenge of isolating potential buyers who would not otherwise have purchased a new vehicle. In addition, the short-lived effect on sales implies that the intertemporal substitution occurred over a rather short time horizon. To the extent that the vehicle scrappage rate varies with vehicle attributes (such as class, size or fuel economy) and new vehicles are purchased to replace used vehicles, setting age thresholds based on the attributes of used vehicles could improve targeting and pull demand from a more distant future. Tables   Figure 1. Timeline of 
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Figure 5. Aggregate Sales Effect over Different Time Horizons
Note: The top figure is based on estimates from the full sample while the bottom figure is based on the short preprogram sample. The 90% confidence intervals are constructed using bootstrap. Note: These are estimation results for equation (1). The dependent variable is the logarithm of vehicle sales The number of observations is 16,776 in the full sample and 13,976 in the short pre-program sample. The full set of control variables described in equation (1) is included in the regressions: dollars per mile, model fixed effects, country-specific seasonality by eligibility type, and year-month common trends by eligibility type. |∆GPM| is the absolute difference between the GPM of the vehicle and the eligibility requirement: the farther away an eligible vehicle"s MPG is away from the requirement, the larger it is. This is true for ineligible vehicles as well. 
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